



The profession of diplomat must now rank as one of the most dangerous in 
the world. Ambassadors and other diplomatic and consular officials have 
become increasingly popular targets for terrorist attack. Some have been shot 
down in cold blood in the streets of Western capitals. Many have been held 
hostage. Often members of their families have been victims of attack. Embassy 
and consular buildings have been bombed, set on fire, and subjected to attack by 
riotous mobs.1 
One would need to search back to 16th century Europe to find an age when 
the lifestyle of ambassadors was comparably insecure. In those days they were 
not, as a rule, paid regular salaries by the governments they served. Yet as the 
personal representatives of their sovereigns they were expected to entertain on a 
grand scale to maintain status, often bankrupting themselves in the process. 
Worse still, as there was no recognised system of diplomatic precedence, they 
were expected to fight for their places at official occasions, and they frequently 
became involved in duels.2 Yet even those discomforts pale in comparison with 
the threats faced by any present-day Western diplomat stationed in a region 
like Central America or the Middle East. 
This increasingly physical danger comes at a time when diplomacy's raison 
d'etre, aptly defined by Sir Ernest Satow as "the conduct of business between 
states by peaceful means",3 is more important than ever. For while it is true that 
the prestige and influence of the resident ambassador and his mission has 
declined from its apogee in 19th century Europe, professional diplomats still 
play a vital part in helping to lubricate and improve relations between govern-
ments. 
They devote patient effort to getting to know the ministers, officials and 
opinion leaders of other states, and their fellow diplomats. Because they are on 
the spot they can be far more effective at assessing situations and trends. A 
sagacious and well-informed ambassador may still play an influential role in 
shaping his own government's policy and in preparing the way for the negotia-
tion of agreements. As a cultural representative and spokesman, he may help to 
increase mutual understanding between peoples. Another very important task 
nowadays is that of enhancing trade, and economic and technical co-operation. 
It is true that increasingly this kind of work is also handled through inter-
national conferences, and by direct contacts between governments. But the 
ambassador's role has certainly not been superseded, and it is worth noting that 
the more opposed governments become in ideology or interests, the more the 
burden of communication tends to devolve on the man on the spot. 
The complex system of modern diplomacy rests on the universal (or near 
universal) acceptance by the international society of states of the fundamental 
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principle of diplomatic reciprocity. Simply, it is that the host states grant the 
immunity of diplomatic missions from constraint and take responsibility for 
protecting missions from molestation, while the sending states accept the rule 
that their diplomats must not interfere in the internal affairs of the host 
country.4 Undoubtedly one of the major reasons why the modern system of 
diplomatic representation is under such strain is that many governments and 
political groups now believe that some states are not observing the rule of 
non-interference in internal affairs. It is foolish to deny that, since the Cold 
War, traditional forms of diplomatic behaviour have been increasingly under-
mined. There are innumerable well-substantiated cases of diplomatic missions 
being used as cover for subversion, terrorism and intervention, and of receiving 
states "bugging" embassies and harassing them in various ways.5 In certain 
countries, and among certain political groups, the diplomatic representatives of 
major powers tend to be seen at best as mischief-makers, at worst as enemy spies 
and saboteurs. Thus, even if one did not take into account the recent spate of 
physical attacks on diplomats, one would have to admit that the institution of 
diplomatic representation is under severe strain and in urgent need of review by 
the international community. 
The present system, embodied in the 1961 Vienna Convention, is all we have. 
In any case it is notoriously difficult to get any consensus on changes in inter-
national law. It would be still more problematic in the anarchic international 
relations of the 1980's. Whatever reforms may be introduced, it is hard to see 
how any diplomatic representation can be viable unless it meets two basic condi-
tions: first, there must be some guaranteed minimum of security against attack 
for the persons and property of diplomatic missions; and, secondly, there must 
be genuine reciprocity, i.e., both sending and receiving states must honour their 
obligations. It is precisely because of the current grave threats on both these 
counts that it is hardly exaggerating to say that the whole system of diplomatic 
representation is under siege. Let me now briefly consider the nature of both 
types of threat, and how the international community might counter them. 
The main threats to the safety of diplomats arise from the growth of 
terrorism. Extremist groups discovered that kidnapping diplomats was one 
effective means of winning tactical objectives, such as the release of prisoners 
from jail, large ransoms and enormous publicity. Success and boldness resulted 
in higher demands. The most popular targets for international terrorist attack 
have been American business executives, diplomats and property. Neo-Marxist 
terrorist groups see them as "legitimate" targets for "revolutionary justice", 
because America is viewed as the leading "capitalist-imperialist power". In 
regions like Latin America and the Middle East, terrorists know that there is a 
reservoir of anti-Americanism and that by hitting unpopular foreigners they are 
less likely to antagonise the population.6 
Western diplomats make easy targets. By its very nature, diplomacy involves 
considerable travel, mingling with the local population, socialising and being 
accessible. What is the good of having an ambassador who has to be incar-
cerated in concrete pillbox, under constant, heavily armed guard? Foreign 
accents and appearance makes them easily identifiable. And even the wealthiest 
states cannot afford elaborate, round-the-clock security for all their diplomats. 
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Any determined and carefully planned terrorist attack has a good chance of 
succeeding. Furthermore, the increasing internationalisation of terrorism means 
that the more highly organized groups can strike in the heart of the Western 
metropolis or in third countries, whenever opportunity arises, sometimes in 
collaboration with sister organizations abroad. No government can be sure 
where the next point of attack will be. 
The new scourge is the seizure of embassies and their staffs and occupants. 
This is a fairly easy operation for terrorists in countries where the security forces 
cannot protect missions adequately. In the resulting mass hostage situations the 
terrorists have many advantages which they exploit to the hilt to wrench large 
concessions from the local regime or the target government. At the same time, 
the government and security forces, provided they are not colluding with the 
terrorists, have one key advantage in a siege: the terrorists are themselves 
hostages, and part of the deal they seek will be a safe exit. This can be used as a 
powerful lever in police siege tactics. 
When about four hundred Iranian students stormed the United States 
embassy in Tehran on November 4th, 1979, and seized 100 hostages, including 
62 United States citizens, the Iranian regime totally failed to carry out its 
obligations under international law. The Islamic revolutionary authorities made 
no attempt to assist the United States diplomatic mission party. They provided 
no police or military protection for United States personnel or property; they 
made no attempt to return the embassy to United States control by expelling the 
insurgents. On the contrary, they compounded their offences against inter-
national law of diplomacy by "adopting" the siege as their own, and by not only 
giving it the official blessing of the Ayatollah Khomeini but also by manipulat-
ing the hostage crisis to inflict maximum international embarrassment and 
humiliation on the United States. This was the first time in recent history that 
any state had so flagrantly defied the norms and conventions of diplomatic 
relations. It is true that other regimes have been heavily involved in the spon-
sorship of international terrorists. States such as the Soviet Union, Libya, Syria 
and Iraq have long regarded this as an attractive weapon to weaken adversary 
states, on an opportunistic basis.7 In the case of the Entebbe hijack, the 
Ugandan dictator, Amin, openly connived with the PFLP hijackers. But in 
recent times, no regime had seen fit to sanction the abduction of a whole 
diplomatic mission. 
The second remarkable feature of the Tehran hostage crisis was the fact that 
the United States, by a narrow margin still the greatest military power, proved 
either unable or unwilling to use its massive military power to compel the 
Iranians to release their diplomats. The Pueblo incident apart, no single event in 
international relations since 1945 has so vividly demonstrated the crippling 
limitations of a superpower unable to risk using its giant's strength against a 
defiant and self-righteous minor power. The humiliation and vilification of the 
USA by Iran was all the more shocking and psychologically intolerable to the 
American public because until the demise of the Shah the United States had 
been the dominant external influence on Iran. Billions of dollars of United 
States investment had been poured into the development of the Iranian oil 
industry and the Shah's ambitious "White Revolution" modernisation 
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programme, and the build up of Iran's military power as a vital ally in South 
West Asia.8 The American public had barely had time to come to terms with the 
toppling of the Shah. To most ordinary Americans, the hatred and abuse hurled 
at them by the screaming mobs paraded before their embassy in Tehran seemed 
quite incomprehensible. The feeling of helplessness and frustration provoked by 
these scenes, displayed on United States television screens, week after week, 
undoubtedly did much to undermine the domestic support and credibility of the 
Carter administration, and the reaction against it, inevitably, helped Reagan, 
with his more hardnosed and assertive stance, to win his overwhelming election 
victory. Nor should we underestimate the extent to which America's credibility 
as an ally was undermined both by the events leading to the Shah's fall and by 
the hostage crisis. Arab states, and particularly Saudi Arabia and the Gulf 
states, looked uneasily around for other forms of security and greater regional 
self-help. The West-Europeans began to recite old doubts and fears about 
America's "reliability" and "failures of leadership".9 
The West European reaction only added to America's feelings of frustration 
and desertion. For the unpalatable fact is that America's NATO allies did 
almost nothing tangible to assist the US in the hostage crisis. It now transpires 
that the British,10 French, West German and Swedish embassies in Tehran all 
refused to shelter six US embassy staff who escaped capture when the US 
embassy was attacked. With allies like these who needs enemies? Canada alone 
acted with courage and integrity in sheltering and facilitating the escape of US 
personnel. Reluctantly and late in the day it is true that the EEC foreign minis-
ters did agree to impose trade sanctions on Iran. But these modest measures 
were undermined by a revolt of backbenchers in the British Parliament who 
insisted on blocking the plan to involve retrospective economic sanctions. None 
of the EEC countries acted to freeze Iranian assets held in European banks. 
Not one state broke off diplomatic relations with Iran in protest at the 
hostage-taking. Iranian diplomats continued to enjoy all normal privileges and 
immunities in every West European state. Some of America's allies, it must be 
admitted, actually sought to capitalise on the Iranian crisis by doing private 
deals with Iran to fill gaps left by the American boycott: France, Britain, West 
Germany, and Japan were all guilty of this economic opportunism." Once again 
commercial greed and fear of adverse consequences to future oil supplies seem 
to have been placed above principles of international law in the conduct of Euro-
pean foreign policy. Of course it is true that one can find a rationale for the 
EEC attitudes. Some argued that there was a real danger of Iran being pushed 
into alliance with the Soviets, and that this made it politic to soft-pedal pressure 
on Iran. But surely, in view of the bitter anti-communism evinced by Khomeini 
and the ulema generally, and the chastening effect of the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan on the Islamic world, this fear was exaggerated. Others argue that 
the EEC states were being helpful to the U.S. by keeping their embassies open, 
as this allowed channels of information and communication to be maintained. 
This sounds reasonable enough until one recalls the gravity of Iran's offence 
against international law, the fact that innocent British citizens in 
Iran were also being imprisoned without trial, and that other diplomatic 
missions were constantly in danger of occupation, on the model of the U.S. 
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embassy takeover.12 To the Iranians the EEC states' behaviour must have 
appeared not only weak, but implicitly turning a blind eye to the abduction of 
US diplomats. In any case the key ultimate negotiations for the hostages' 
release were not conducted through diplomatic missions in Tehran, but in a third 
country, Algeria, thousands of miles away from Iran. Resolute action by the 
Western European NATO allies would not have in any way precluded or 
prevented US-Iranian negotiations. 
It is easy enough to criticise the Carter Administration's own response to the 
crisis. At times they seemed almost mesmerized by the propaganda of humilia-
tion and abuse heaped upon them from Tehran. When they were not actually 
paralyzed by their own indecision about what to do, for example over the fate of 
the Shah, they often appeared to be merely reacting to the propaganda ploys and 
initatives of the fundamentalists in Tehran. The President and his advisers did 
not seem to have listened properly to the expert advice they were getting from 
their own team in Iran before the takeover, including the clear warnings that a 
takeover was imminent,13 or to the best advice available in the U.S. and in allied 
countries on the special problems of response to international terrorism. Too 
many general administrators and senior U.S. politicians apparently thought 
they understood what was going on and how to cope with it: in fact they were not 
dealing with a totally unprecedented problem. The scale of the abduction was 
new, but the State Department had built up a rich fund of knowledge, indeed 
almost unrivalled experience in coping with the protection of diplomats and 
diplomatic premises and the problems of hostage negotiation and rescue. Yet 
some of the "old hands" with intimate practical knowledge were not even 
peremptorily consulted. Three of America's closest allies — West Germany, 
France, and Israel — had very recent experience of successful long-range rescue 
operations in terrorist situations: yet none of the lessons learnt in these cases 
were taken into account by the U.S. planners. 
It is painful but necessary to spell out some lessons of the abortive U.S. rescue 
attempt of April, 1980. Some, though by no means all, of these lessons are 
implicit in the findings of the official Government inquiry into the failure of the 
mission.14 First there is the vital matter of the decision concerning the feasibility 
and timing of the rescue attempt. Arguably the US Administration should have 
moved far more swiftly, in the very early days of the hostage-taking, if the 
rescue was to have any chance of success. A surprise assault at that stage would 
have caught the Iranians far less prepared: the Islamic fundamentalists had not 
had time to reorganize and deploy the Iranian armed forces, they were still 
establishing their hold over the country, and in the climate of general chaos a 
really powerful airborne assault might have had some chance of success. Of 
course it is true that the U.S. did not have a powerful military or naval presence, 
at that stage, in the Gulf area. But arrangements could have been made rapidly 
and easily with one of their traditional allies within easy striking distance of 
Iran, to use their airfields to launch the assault. Turkey or Israel would have 
seemed obvious candidates. Once this opportunity for a rapid response opera-
tion was lost there is a strong case for saying that the military option had 
become impracticable, dangerous, and hence potentially, politically and 
strategically counter-productive long before the actual April attempt. 
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Even supposing that these arguments could have been overcome, the opera-
tional planning proved an unmitigated disaster. The whole concept of using an 
improvised multi-service unit should have been discarded at the outset. Inter-
service rivalries and suspicions are always a threat to such operations. It was 
essential to use a unit-in-being with established experience and the highest 
quality training in the airborne rescue mission role.15 The April operation was 
disastrously weak in terms of aircraft and firepower, so that even if they had 
made it to their target it is highly unlikely that they would have survived opposi-
tion from the Iranian airforce, artillery and rockets. Again, it is almost incred-
ible that there were not enough helicopters in reserve to make good the losses 
caused by technical failures, prior to the fatal collision.16 Perhaps the most 
striking deficiencies that emerged were those of command and control. The 
President and his staff appear to have had the ability to inhibit the scope and 
firepower of the operation, yet do not seem to have either been made aware by 
their top military advisers of the grave risks and problems of such an operation, 
or to have been in a position to control it and restore the situation once things 
had begun to go wrong. Contrast President Kennedy's crisis management of the 
U.S. naval blockade in the Cuban missile crisis, 1962. Relevant experience of 
America's allies on the problems and requirements for a successful long-range 
hostage rescue operation, for example the experience of Israel at Entebbe and 
the FRG at Mogadishu, does not appear to have in any way informed the U.S. 
military planners. In sum one must conclude that the failure of the U.S. rescue 
mission in April was not primarily due to deficiencies of military technology or 
equipment failure, as so widely assumed: it was mainly due to inadequate 
strategy, failures of military planning, and deficiencies in organisation, 
command and control. It is an appalling commentary on the failure of the top 
U.S. military and civilian officials to acquire the special knowledge and skills 
required to handle the tasks of countering international terrorism and other 
forms of low-level conflict. It confirms the judgement formed by experienced 
observers of this kind of unconventional conflict during the US involvement in 
Vietnam: the US, despite its huge armoury of nuclear and conventional hard-
ware, has not yet mastered the arts of contending with terrorism and unconven-
tional conflict. 
At the end of the day the diplomats and foreign affairs experts in the State 
Department came out of the business with far less damage to their credibility. 
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance immediately set about diplomatic initiatives, at 
the UN, through the European NATO allies, and through friendly Moslem 
states, to bring pressure to bear on the Iranian authorities, and to concert inter-
national condemnation and isolation of Iran for its grave offence against inter-
national law. This diplomatic effort helped considerably in offsetting the propa-
ganda tirade from Tehran which was attempting to extract maximum U.S. 
humiliation from the crisis. 
Astonishingly, it appears that Mr. Vance did not participate in the crucial 
decision to send in a military rescue force.17 Had he been properly consulted it is 
clear that he would have advised strongly against launching such an operation at 
that stage. In the event he had no option but to resign his post. His departure 
from office in this manner, almost unprecedented in recent American politics, 
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must be taken as striking evidence of the failure of co-ordination and 
communication within the U.S. Administration at the height of the crisis."* 
Mr. Warren Christopher, the Deputy Secretary of State intimately involved 
in the negotiations for the release of the hostages through the good offices of 
Algeria, has perhaps not been accorded sufficient credit for the way he patiently 
worked to overcome the previous disasters, to achieve terms for the release of 
the hostages which are in themselves something of a tour de force. The U.S. did 
not, after all, pay ransom money to Iran. All the funds that the Iranians have 
recovered have been assets that were frozen by the U.S.. Iran has not been able 
to make good the losses she incurred as a result of the economic sanctions 
exerted by the U.S. and other Western states. Moreover, the fact that the 
hostages' ultimate release brought to light the prolonged terrorisation and 
mental torture of the hostages by their captors did much to offset the earlier 
psychological damage suffered by the U.S. The testimony of the hostages 
relayed on the world media only served to confirm the growing international 
impression that the regime of the mullahs in Iran was not merely obscurantist 
and anti-Western, but also that it had committed barbarities against the 
innocent. The ultimate release of the hostages on the day of President Reagan's 
inauguration was in a way a victory for patient diplomacy, and one for which 
President Carter himself, for all his earlier mistakes, must take considerable 
credit. 
Even so it must be admitted that the moral and political costs of the hostage 
crisis are huge. There is the extensive damage to U.S. credibility both in terms of 
domestic and international opinion, and the undermining of the U.S. strategic 
position vis-a-vis S.W. Asia and the Gulf. Also very serious is the encourage-
ment given to other "rogue" states to engage in or support acts of international 
terrorism against an adversary. More specifically, the abduction of the U.S. 
diplomats by Iran is likely to inspire similar acts by other states, however tin-pot 
their defences and however crack-pot their policies, as a means of giving vent to 
their rage and hatred against Western countries. The United States is likely to 
continue to be a particularly favoured target, though the United Kingdom, 
France and West Germany are also, for various reasons, highly vulnerable. 
Moreover, the Iranian case sets an unfortunate precedent at a time when 
international law of diplomacy is being increasingly violated. In 1979 alone a 
record total of 26 embassies and consulates around the world were occupied, and 
a further dozen were occupied in the first two months of 1980. Diplomatic 
terrorism appears to have become just as contagious as aircraft hijacking was 
between 1969 and 1971.19 
The US experience in Iran should greatly increase the urgency with which 
conscientious governments tighten up on their responsibilities of diplomatic 
protection, both in their roles as host and sending states. This involves improved 
intelligence and security co-operation between host and sending states, better 
resources, manpower and training for diplomatic protection personnel,2" and a 
stricter adherence to the obligations of the Vienna Treaty on Diplomatic 
Relations (1961). Indeed there is a strong case for reconvening the Vienna 
conference with a view to strengthening the safeguards of the diplomatic 




However none of these improvements in diplomatic security really assist in a 
case such as the Tehran hostage-taking, where a whole regime connives at an act 
of diplomatic terrorism. Where a state chooses to defy the norms and conven-
tions recognised by the bulk of. the international community much stronger 
weapons are clearly required by the latter to compel compliance. 
Firstly, there is the need to develop and refine the military option. At the end 
of the day it may be decided that it would be wiser not to employ military inter-
vention to mount a rescue operation, especially if the delinquent state is both 
fanatically ruthless and heavily armed. The resulting loss of innocent life and the 
danger of triggering a major war may rule out the possibility of a military rescue 
force option. However there may be occasions, as exemplified at Entebbe, when 
a military option is both feasible and desirable. For this purpose governments 
should be closely reviewing their contingency plans and improving the profes-
sionalism and training of their own elite rescue units. And in those regions of the 
world, such as the Gulf or Central and South America, where many smaller 
states do not have any elite military unit capable of this task, it is clearly an 
urgent necessity for regional organizations and groupings of states to establish 
units to carry out specialized hostage rescue on behalf of any member state 
where it is required. An alternative umbrella would be the United Nations: 
certain appropriate forces for hostage rescue could be earmarked by the UN for 
use on a regional basis. By agreement, the regional grouping could adopt 
arrangements to mobilize rescue operations even in the rare case of a state 
collaborating with the terrorists. As the UN Charter certainly envisaged peace 
enforcement, difficult though this may be to achieve in practice, surely one can 
envisage a more modest type of enforcement mechanism for the rescue of the 
innocent? 
However, facing the realities of contemporary international relations, we 
must recognize that even a major power may baulk at the wider risks of using 
the military option for hostage rescue, and where states fear to tread, the 
regional organizations and the UN may also be unwilling to act. Is there then no 
other sanction open to an aggrieved state where a delinquent regime commits an 
act of international terrorism against its diplomats, businessmen or ordinary 
citizens? Should we not consider some form of international sanction more 
powerful than expelling individual diplomats or breaking diplomatic relations, 
yet less risky than engaging in military action? One possibility that might be 
considered is to establish new forms of international retorsions — that is to say, 
international legal reprisals against the delinquent state. These might take the 
form of strong economic sanctions, though the record shows that these do not 
really bite unless they are applied by the entire international community. More 
realistically, the international community could agree to amend the code of 
diplomatic practice in the following way: in the event of a regime abducting a 
diplomatic mission, or in any other way seriously violating the immunities of 
foreign diplomatic personnel, the diplomats of the delinquent state posted in the 
state which they have victimized shall immediately forfeit their immunities and 
privileges and be liable for imprisonment until such time as the rights and 
immunities of the victimized state are restored. We may need exceptional inter-
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national retorsions of this kind if we are to prevent a recurrence of Tehran-style 
abduction. It was patently unjust that Iranian diplomats in Washington were 
able to enjoy their full privileges while the Americans in Tehran were being so 
foully mistreated, and that the US authorities should have then allowed the 
Iranians to return home unhindered, when the formal breach of diplomatic 
relations occurred. The normal laws and rights covering the treatment of 
diplomats had surely been forfeited by Iran, and hence forceful diplomatic 
reprisals were more than justified. Of course the Iranian Mullahs would not 
have cared tuppence for the fate of their own diplomats. Nevertheless the 
symbolic and psychological value of strong action by the US would have been 
invaluable in signalling that Iran's behaviour had gone beyond civilised bounds, 
and in bringing home to Iran and any would-be delinquent states that the 
abduction of diplomats was not cost free. This is what deterrance is all about. 
The Iranian experience shows that where diplomatic security and low-level 
violence are concerned we must learn to think in terms of more imaginative and 
psychologically dramatic and effective responses. Our very predictability and 
conformity to hidebound traditional responses almost certainly increases our 
vulnerability to international muggers. 
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THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: A NEW STAGE? 
by 
Mordechai Abir 
The Arab-Israeli conflict is an extension of the conflict between the Arab 
national movement and the Jewish national movement over the territory of 
Palestine. As the political/strategic importance of the Arabs increased in the 
1950's and to a much greater extent in the 1970's — owing to the west's depen-
dence on Middle East oil supplies — the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Pales-
tinian problem which lies at its heart assumed an importance in the international 
arena out of all proportion to its true dimensions. It is doubtful that any other 
issue achieved the prominence of the Arab cause in world affairs in the 1960's 
and 1970's. 
Modern Arab nationalism claims that its roots can be found in the second part 
of the 19th century, although most scholars consider the first decades of the 20th 
century to be the true beginning of this movement.1 From the start Arab nation-
alism transcended political borders in the Middle East and by the 1950's the 
Pan-Arabist movement was struggling to unify an Arab nation whose territory 
stretched from the Atlantic Ocean to the Persian Gulf. Early Arab nationalists 
and Western scholars describe Arab nationalism to be that of people whose 
language is Arabic, whose culture is the Arab culture, who consider themselves 
Arabs and who live, or wish to live, in the Arab homeland.2 In recent years Islam 
has become a major criteria of Arab nationalism. This point has been hotly 
contested in the past by the Arab intelligentsia who felt that a modern national 
movement should be secular. Moreover, many in the movement were Christian 
Arabs, some of whom acted as ideologists. Nonetheless, in spite of divisions 
owing to administrative considerations and the ambitions and rivalries of local 
leaders, the Muslim Umma (community) had for centuries served as the politi-
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